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Abstract. Often an attacker tries to
disconnect a network by destroying
nodes or edges, while the defender
counters using various resilience
mechanisms. Examples include a music
industry body attempting to close down
a peer-to-peer file-sharing network;
medics attempting to halt the spread of
an infectious disease by selective
vaccination; and a police agency trying
to decapitate a terrorist organisation.
Albert, Jeong and Baraba´si famously
analysed the static case, and showed
that vertex
-order attacks are effective against
scale-free networks. We extend this work
to the dynamic case by developing a
framework based on evolutionary game
theory to explore the interaction of
attack and defence strategies. We show,
first, that naive defences don’t work
against vertex-order attack; second, that
defences based on simple redundancy
don’t work much better, but that
defences based on cliques work well;
third, that attacks based on centrality
work better against clique defences than
vertex-order attacks do; and fourth, that
defences based on complex strategies
such as delegation plus clique resist
centrality attacks better than simple
clique defences. Our models thus build a
bridge between network analysis and
evolutionary game theory, and provide a
framework for analysing defence and
attack in networks where topology
matters. They suggest definitions of
efficiency of attack and defence, and may
even explain the evolution of insurgent
organisations from networks of cells to a
more virtual leadership that facilitates
operations rather than directing them.
Finally, we draw some conclusions and
present possible directions for future
research.
1 Introduction
Many modern conflicts turn on connectivity.
In conventional war, much effort is expended
on disrupting the other side’s command,
control and communications by jamming or
destroying his facilities. Counterterrorism
operations involve a similar effort but with
different tools: traffic analysis to trace
communications, coupled with surveillance of
the flows of money, material and recruits,
followed by the arrest and interrogation of
individuals who appear to be significant
nodes. Terrorists are aware of this, and take
measures to prevent their networks being
traced. Usama bin Laden described his
strategy on the videotape captured in
Afghanistan as ‘Those who were trained to fly
didn’t know the others. One group of people
didn’t know the other group’ (see [14], which
describes the hijackers’ networks).
Connectivity matters for social dominance
too, as a handful of leading individuals do much
of the work of holding a society together. Sub-
verting or killing these leaders is likely to be
the cheapest way to make an invaded coun-
try submit. When the Norman French invaded
England in the eleventh century, they killed or
impoverished most of the indigenous landown-
ers; when the Turks, and then the Mongols, in-
vaded India, they killed both landowners and
priests; when England suppressed the Scottish
highlands after the 1745 uprising, landowners
were induced to move to Edinburgh or London;
and in many of the dreadful events of the last
century, rulers targeted the elite (Russian ku-
laks, Polish officers, Tutsi schoolteachers, . . . ).
Moving from politics to commerce, the mu-
sic industry spends a lot of money attempting
to disrupt peer-to-peer file-sharing networks.
Techniques range from technical attacks to ag-
gressive litigation against individuals believed
to have been running major nodes.
Networks of personal contacts are
important in other applications too. In public
health, for example, it often happens that a
small number of individuals account for much
of the transmission of a disease. Thus Senegal
has been more effective at tackling the spread
of HIV/AIDS than other African countries, as
they targeted prostitutes [19]. In fact, interest
in social networks has grown greatly over the
last 15 years in the humanities and social
sciences [20,9].
Recent advances in the theory of networks
have provided us with the mathematical and
computational tools to understand such
phenomena better. One striking result is that
a network much of whose connectivity comes
from a small number of highly-connected
nodes can be very efficient, but at the cost of
extreme vulnerability. As a simple example, if
everyone in the county communicates using
one telephone exchange, and that burns down,
then everyone is isolated.
This paper starts to explore the tactical
and strategic options open to combatants in
such conflicts. What strategies can one adopt,
when building a network, to provide good
trade-offs between efficiency and resilience?
We are particularly interested in complex
networks, involving thousands or millions of
nodes, which are so complicated (or under
such dispersed control) that the resilience
rules can only be implemented locally, rather
than by a central planner who deliberately
designs a network with multiple redundant
backbones.
Is it possible, for example, to create a
virtual high-degree node, by combining a
number of nodes which appear on external
inspection to have lower degree? For example,
a number of individuals might join together in
a ring, and use some covert communications
channel to route sensitive information round
the ring in a manner shielded from casual
external inspection. There is a loose precedent
in Chaum’s ‘dining cryptographers’
construction [10], in which a number of
cryptographers pass messages round a ring in
such a way as to mask, from insiders, the
source and destination of encrypted traffic.
Can we build a similar construction, but in
which the fact of systematic message routing
is concealed from outsiders, with the result
that the participants appear to be ‘ordinary’
nodes making a modest contribution in the
network, rather than important nodes that
should be targeted for close inspection and/or
destruction?
2 Previous Work
There has been rapid progress in recent years
in understanding how networks can develop
organically, how their growth influences their
topology, and how the topology in turn affects
both their capacity and their robustness.
There is now a substantial literature: for a
book-length introduction, see Watts [21],
while literature surveys are [1,17]
Early work by Erdo¨s and Renyi modelled
networks as random graphs [11,7]; this is
mathematically interesting but does not
model most real-world networks accurately. In
real networks, path lengths are generally
shorter; it is well known that any two people
are linked by a chain of maybe half a dozen
others who are pairwise acquainted – known
as the ‘small-world’ phenomenon. This idea
was popularised by Milgram in the 60s [16].
An explanation started to emerge in 1998
when Watts and Strogatz produced the alpha
model. Alpha is a parameter that expresses
the tendency of nodes to introduce their
neighbours to each other; with α = 0, each
node is connected to its neighbours’
neighbours, so the network is a set of
disconnected cliques, while with α = ∞, we
have a random graph. They discovered that,
for critical values of α, a small-world network
resulted. The alpha model is rather complex
to analyse, so they next introduced the beta
network: this is constructed by arranging
nodes in a ring, each node being connected to
its r neighbours on either side, then replacing
existing links with random links according to
a parameter β; for β = 0 no links are replaced,
and for β = 1 all links have been replaced, so
that the network has again become a random
graph [22]. The effect is to provide a mix of
local and long-distance links that models
observed phenomena in social and other
networks.
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How do networks with short path lengths
come about in the real world? The simplest
explanation involves preferential attachment.
Baraba´si and Albert showed in 1999 how, if
new nodes in a network prefer to attach to
nodes that already have many edges, this
leads to a power-law distribution of vertex
order which in turn gives rise to a scale-free
network [6], which turns out to be a more
common type of network than the alpha or
beta types. In a social network, for example,
people who already have many friends are
useful to know, so their friendship is
particularly sought by newcomers. In
friendship terms, the rich get richer. There are
many economic contexts in which such
dynamics are also of interest [13].
The key paper for our purposes was written
by Albert, Jeong, and Baraba´si in 2000. They
observed that the connectivity of scale-free net-
works, which depends on the highly-connected
nodes, comes at a price: the destruction of these
nodes will disconnect the network. If an at-
tacker removes the best-connected nodes one
after another, then past some threshold point
the size of the largest component of the graph
collapses [2].
Later work by Holme, Kim, Yoon and Han
in 2002 extended this from attacks on vertices
to attacks on edges; here, the attacker removes
edges connecting high-degree nodes, and again,
past some critical point, the network becomes
disconnected [15]. They also suggested using
centrality – technically, this is the ‘betweenness
centrality’ of Freeman [12] – as an alternative
to degree for attack targeting. (A node’s cen-
trality is, roughly speaking, the proportion of
paths on which it lies.) Computing centrality
is harder work for the attacker than observing
vertex degree, but it enables him to attack net-
works (such as beta networks) where there is
little or no variability in vertex order. Finally,
in 2004, Zhao, Park and Lai modelled the cir-
cumstances in which a scale-free network can
suffer cascading breakdown from the successive
failure of high-connectivity nodes [23]. These
ideas find some resonance in the field of strate-
gic studies: for example, Soviet doctrine called
for destroying a third of the enemy’s network,
jamming a further third, and hoping that the
remaining third would collapse under the in-
creased weight of traffic.
3 Naive Defences Don’t Work
Given the obvious importance of the subject,
and the fact that the Albert-Jeong-Baraba´si
paper appeared in 2000, one obvious question
is why there has been no published work since
on how a network can defend itself against a
decapitation attack. Here is one possible expla-
nation: the two obvious defences don’t work.
One of these is simply to replenish
destroyed nodes with new nodes, and furnish
them with edges according to the same
scale-free rule that was used to generate the
network initially. One might hope that some
equilibrium would be found between attack
and defence.
The other obvious defence is to replenish
destroyed nodes, but to wire their edges
according to a random graph model. In this
way, we might hope that, under attack, a
network would evolve from an efficient
scale-free structure into a less efficient but
more resilient random structure. In a real
application, this might happen either as a
result of nodes learning new behaviour, or by
selective pressure on a node population with
heterogeneous connectivity preferences: in
peacetime the nodes with higher degree would
become hubs, while in wartime they would be
early casualties.
Nice as these ideas may seem in theory,
they do not work at all well in practice.
Figure 1 shows first (solid line) how the
vertex-order attack of Albert, Jeong and
Baraba´si works against a simulated
network with no replenishment, then with
random replenishment, then with scalefree
replenishment. In the vanilla case the attack
takes two rounds to disconnect the network;
with random replenishment it takes three, and
with scale-free replenishment it takes four.
It seems that, to defend against these
kinds of decapitation attacks on networks, we
will need smarter defence strategies. But how
should these be evolved, and what sort of
framework should we use to evaluate them?
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Fig. 1. Naive defences against vertex-order de-
capitation attack
4 A Model from Evolutionary Game
Theory
Previous researchers considered disruptive at-
tacks on networks to be a single-round game.
Such a model is suitable for applications such
as a conventional war, in which the attacker has
to expend a certain amount of effort to destroy
the defender’s command, control and communi-
cations, and one wishes to estimate how much;
or a single epidemic in which a certain amount
of resource must be spent to bring the disease
under control.
However, there are many applications in
which attack and defense evolve through
multiple rounds: terrorism and music-sharing
are only two examples. We now develop a
framework for considering this more general
case. We apply ideas from evolutionary game
theory developed by Axelrod and others [3,4].
This theory studies how games of multiple
rounds differ from single-round games, and it
has turned out to have significant explanatory
power in applications from ethology to
economics.
We now formalise a model in which a game
is played with a number of rounds. Each round
consists of attack followed by recovery. Recov-
ery in turn consists of two phases: replenish-
ment and adaptation.
In the attack phase, the attacker destroys
a number of nodes (or, in a variant, of edges);
this number is his budget. He selects nodes for
destruction according to some rule, which is his
strategy. For example, he might at each round
destroy the ten nodes with the largest number
of edges connected to them. He executes this
strategy on the basis of information about the
network topology.
In the replenishment phase, the defend-
ing nodes recruit a number of new nodes, and
go through a phase of establishing connections
– again, according to given strategies and in-
formation.
In the adaptation phase, the defending
nodes may rewire links within each connected
component of the network, in accordance with
some defensive strategy. The adaptation phase
is applied once at the start of the game,
before the first round of attack; thereafter the
game proceeds attack – replenish – adapt.
An attack strategy is more efficient, for a
given defense strategy, if an attacker using it
requires a smaller budget to disrupt the net-
work. Similarly, a defense strategy is more ef-
ficient if, for a given attack strategy, it com-
pels the attacker to expend a higher budget
to achieve network disruption. (We will clarify
this later once we have presented and discussed
a few simulations.)
We assume initially that the attacker has
perfect information about the network topol-
ogy, and that her goal is simply to partition
the network – that is, divide it into two or
more nontrivial disjoint components. We as-
sume that the defender has only local informa-
tion, that it, each node shares the information
available to those nodes with which it is con-
nected. Thus, for example, if the attacker man-
ages to split the network into two components,
there is no way for them to reconnect. We also
start off by assuming that the defence strategy
affects only the adaptation phase, as only once
nodes have connected to a network can they be
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programmed to follow it; so the replenishment
phase is exogenous.
A further initial assumption is that the at-
tack and defence budgets are roughly equal. By
this we will mean that for each node destroyed
in the attack phase, one node will be replaced in
the resource addition phase. Thus the network
will neither grow or shrink in absolute size and
we can concentrate on connectivity effects. We
will discuss other possible assumptions later,
but the static budgets and global attack / lo-
cal defence assumptions will get us started.
5 Defence Evolution – First Round
To analyse the vulnerability of a network, the
selection of network elements (nodes or edges)
destroyed in each round is the attacker’s
choice and constitutes her strategy. The
attacker wishes to maximize the network
damage caused per unit of work.
We will start off by considering a static at-
tacker, using what we know to be a reason-
able attack (vertex-order), and examine how
the defence strategy can adapt. Then we will
see what better attacks can be found against
the best defence we found. Then we will look
for a defence against the best attack we found
in the last round, and so on. There is no guar-
antee that the process converges – there may
be a specialised attack that works well against
each defence, and vice versa – but if evolution-
ary games on networks behave like more tra-
ditional evolutionary games, we may expect to
find some strategies that do well overall, as ‘tit
for tat’ does in multi-round prisoners’ dilemma.
We may also expect to gain useful insights in
the process.
5.1 Defense strategy 1 – random
replenishment
Our first defensive strategy is the simplest of
all, and is one of the naive defences introduced
in the above section. New nodes are joined to
the graph at random. We assume that each at-
tack round removes r nodes, and the replenish-
ment round adds exactly r nodes, each of which
is joined to the surviving vertices with proba-
bility p. r remains constant for each run of the
simulation, while p increases from k/(N − r)
to k/(N − 1) as the replenishment proceeds. In
this strategy, the defender does nothing in the
adaptation phase.
This models the case where new recruits to
a subversive network simply contact any other
subversives they can find; no attempt is made
to reshape the network in response to the cap-
ture of leaders but the network is simply al-
lowed to become more amorphous.
5.2 Defense strategy 2 – dining
steganographers
Our second defensive strategy is more
sophisticated, and is inspired by the theory of
anonymous communication as developed by
computer scientists, most notably Chaum [10].
A node that acquires a high vertex order, and
thus could be threatened by a vertex-order
attack, splits itself into n nodes, arranged in a
ring. The rings have two functions. First, they
provide resilience: a ring broken at one point
still supports communications between all its
surviving nodes, and it is the simplest such
structure. Second, nodes can route covert
traffic between appropriate input and output
links, and use encryption and other
information-hiding mechanisms to conceal the
traffic. This model was originally presented in
Chaum’s seminal ‘dining cryptographers’
paper cited above, so we might refer to it
as the ‘dining steganographers’. The
collaborating nodes in each ring cannot
conceal the existence of communication
between them, as the cover traffic is visible to
the attacker. However, from the attacker’s
viewpoint it is not obvious that these n nodes
are acting as a virtual supernode.
Our focus here is on the effects of network
topology, rather than on the higher-layer mech-
anisms that actually implement the covertness
property and that provide any confidentiality
of content or of routing data. We assume a
world in which there is sufficient encrypted traf-
fic (SSL, SSH, DRM, . . . ) that encrypted traffic
is not of itself suspicious so long as it is wrapped
in a common ciphertext type. The attacker’s
input consists of traffic data collected from the
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backbone or from ISPs, and her output con-
sists of decisions to send police officers to raid
the premises associated with particular IP ad-
dresses. Her problem is this: given an observed
pattern of communications, whom should she
investigate first?
The precise mechanism of ring formation in
our simulation is as follows. A vulnerable node
decides to create a ring and recruits for the
purpose a further n − 1 nodes from the new
nodes introduced in the most recent replenish-
ment round, or, if they are inadequate, from
among its immediate neighbours. Existing ring
members cannot be recruited, so rings may not
overlap. Finally, recruits to a ring relinquish
any existing links with the rest of the network,
and the ring-forming node shares its external
links uniformly among all the members of the
ring.
5.3 Defense strategy 3 – revolutionary
cells
Our third defensive strategy is inspired by
cells of revolutionaries, along the model
favoured historically by a number of insurgent
organisations. A node that acquires a high
vertex order splits itself into n nodes, all
linked with each other, with the previous
outside connections split uniformly between
them. In graph-theoretic language, each
supernode is a clique.
As in ring formation, a node that considers
itself vulnerable is allowed to split itself into a
clique of nodes. The new nodes are drawn either
from the pool of new nodes, or, if they are insuf-
ficient, from low-vertex-order neighbours of the
clique-forming node. As before, this node’s ex-
ternal edges are distributed uniformly among
members, while other member nodes’ former
external edges are deleted.
Simulations – first set For our first set of
simulations, we consider a scalefree network of
N = 400 nodes. We use a Baraba´si-Albert net-
work created by the following algorithm:
1. Growth: Starting with m0 = 40 nodes, at
each round we add m = 10 new nodes, each
with 3 edges.
2. Preferential Attachment: The probability
that a new node connects to node i is
Π(ki) = ki/
∑
j kj where ki is the degree
of node i.
Having created the scalefree network, we
then ran each of the above defensive strategies
against a vertex-order attack.
Results The results of the initial three simu-
lations are given in Figure 2.
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Fig. 2. Vertex order decapitation attack in
rings, cliques and with no adaptation
The red graph in Figure 2 provides a cali-
bration baseline. As seen in the above section,
random replenishment without adaptation is
ineffective: within three rounds the size of the
largest connected component has fallen by a
half, from 400 nodes to well under 200.
The green graph shows that rings give
only a surprisingly short-term defence benefit.
They postpone network collapse from about
two rounds qto about a dozen rounds.
Thereafter, the network is almost completely
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disconnected. In fact, the outcome is even
worse than with random replenishment.
Cliques, on the other hand, work well. A
few vertices are disconnected at each attack
round, but as the cyan graph shows, the net-
work itself remains robustly connected. This
may provide some insight into why, although
rings have seemed attractive to theoreticians,
those real revolutionary movements that have
left some trace in the history books have used
a cell structure instead.
6 Attack Evolution – First Round
Having tried a number of defence strategies and
found that one of them – cliques – is effective,
the next step is to try out a number of at-
tack strategies to see if any of them is effective
against our defences, and in particular against
cliques.
Of the attack strategies we tried against a
clique defence, the best performer is an attack
based on centrality. We used the centrality
algorithm of Brandes [8] to select the
highest-centrality nodes for destruction at
each round. As before, our calibration baseline
is random replenishment. For this, the red and
black graphs show performance against
vertex-order and centrality attacks
respectively. Both are equally effective; within
two or three rounds the size of the largest
connected component has been halved.
The green and blue graphs show that the
same holds for rings: the network collapses
completely after about a dozen rounds.
Centrality attacks are very slightly more
effective but there is not much in it.
The most interesting results from these
simulations come from the magenta and cyan
graphs, which show how cliques behave. Cyan
shows, as before, a vertex-order attack with
severity m = 10 being ineffective against a
clique defence. Magenta shows the effect on
such a network of a centrality attack. Here the
largest connected component retains about
400 nodes until the network suddenly
partitions at 14 rounds, whereafter a
largest-component size of about 200 is
maintained stably.
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Fig. 3. Rings and Cliques defense under vertex
order and centrality attacks
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Some insight into the internal mechanics
can be gleaned from Figure 4. This shows the
average inverse geodesic length. For each
node, we find the length of the shortest path
to each other node, and take the inverse (we
take the length to be infinite, and thus the
inverse to be zero, if the nodes are in disjoint
components). We average this value over all
n(n − 1)/2 pairs of nodes. This value falls
sharply for defense without adaptation, and
falls steadily for defense with rings. These falls
reflect increasing difficulty in internode
communication. With cliques, the vertex-order
attack has little effect, while the centrality
attack makes steadily increasing progress on a
graph of 400 vertices, until it achieves
partition and reduces the largest component
to about 200 vertices. But it makes only slow
progress thereafter.
6.1 Clique sizes
We next ran a simulation comparing how well
defense works when using different sizes of rings
and cliques. Ring size appears to make little dif-
ference; rings are just not an effective defence
other than in the very short term. However,
varying the clique size yields the results dis-
played in Figure 5.
This shows that under a centrality attack,
the performance of the defense increases
steadily with the size of the clique. There is
still a phase transition after about 14 rounds
or so after which the largest connected
component becomes significantly smaller, but
the size of this equilibrium component
increases steadily from about 150 with clique
size 8 to almost 300 at clique size 20.
7 Defence Evolution – Second
Round
Now that we know centrality attacks are power-
ful, we have tried a number of other possible de-
fences. The most promising at present appears
to be a compound defence based on cliques and
delegation.
The idea behind delegation is fairly
simple. A node that is becoming too
well-connected selects one of its neighbours as
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Fig. 5. Clique recovery with different clique
sizes under a centrality attack
a ‘deputy’ and connects it to a second
neighbour, with which it then disconnects.
This reflects normal human behaviour even in
peacetime: busy leaders pass new recruits on
to colleagues. In wartime, and with an enemy
that might resort to vertex-order attacks, the
incentive to delegate is even greater. Thus a
terrorist leader who gets an offer from a
wealthy businessman to finance an attack
might simply introduce him to a young
militant who wants to carry one out. The
leader need now maintain communications
with at most one of the two.
Delegation on its own is rather slow; it takes
dozens of rounds for delegation to ‘immunise’ a
network against vertex-order attack. If a vanilla
scale-free network is going to be exposed to ei-
ther a vertex-order or centrality attack from the
next round, then drastic action (such as clique
formation) is needed at once; else it will be dis-
connected within two or three rounds. Slower
defences like delegation can however play a role,
provided they are started from network forma-
tion or a reasonable time period (say 20 rounds)
before the attack begins.
It turns out that the delegation defence,
on its own, is rather like the rings of dining
steganographers. Network fragmentation is
postponed (about 14 rounds with the
parameters used here) though not ultimately
averted.
What is interesting, however, is this. If we
form a network and immunise it by running the
delegation strategy, then run a clique defence
as well from the initiation of hostilities, this
compound strategy works rather better than
ordinary cliques. Figure 6 shows the simulation
results.
Figure 7 may give some insight into the
mechanisms. Delegation results in shorter path
lengths under attack: it postpones and slows
down the growth of path length that otherwise
results from hub elimination. As a result, equi-
librium is achieved later, and with a larger min-
imum connected component.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have built a bridge between
network science and evolutionary game theory.
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o
o
oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
Centrality attack 
with Cliques and Delegation
Rounds
Av
er
ag
e 
In
ve
rs
e
G
eo
de
sic
 L
en
gt
h
0 No replenishment
Delegation
Clique
Clique + Delegation
Fig. 7. Clique, immunization by delegation,
and combined clique and delegation defenses
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For some years, people have discussed
what sort of communications topologies might
be ideal for covert communication in the
presence of powerful adversaries, and whether
network science might be of practical use in
covert conflicts – whether to insurgents or to
counterinsurgency forces [5,18]. Our work
makes a start on dealing with this question
systematically.
Albert, Jeong and Baraba´si showed that al-
though a scalefree network provides better con-
nectivity, this comes at a cost in robustness – an
opponent can disconnect a network quickly by
concentrating its firepower on well-connected
nodes. In this paper, we have asked the logical
next questions. What sort of defence should be
planned by operators of such a network? And
what sort of framework can be developed in
which to test successive refinements of attack,
defense, counterattack and so on?
First, we have shown that naive defences
don’t work. Simply replacing dead hubs with
new recruits does not slow down the attacker
much, regardless of whether link replacement
follows a random or scale-free pattern.
Moving from a single-shot game to a re-
peated game provides a useful framework. It
enables concepts of evolutionary game theory
to be applied to network problems.
Next, we used the framework to explore two
more sophisticated defensive strategies. In one,
potentially vulnerable high-order nodes are re-
placed with rings of nodes, inspired by a stan-
dard technique in anonymous communications.
In the other, they are replaced by cliques, in-
spired by the cell structure often used in rev-
olutionary warfare. To our surprise we found
that rings were all but useless, while cliques
are remarkably effective. This may be part of
the reason why cell structures have been widely
used by capable insurgent groups.
Next, we searched for attacks that work
better against clique defences. We found that
the centrality attack of Holme et al does
indeed appear to be more powerful, although
it can be more difficult to mount as evaluating
node centrality involves knowledge of the
entire topology of the network. Centrality
attacks may reflect the modern reality of
counterinsurgency based on pervasive
communications intelligence and, in
particular, traffic analysis.
Now we are searching for defences that work
better against centrality attacks. A promising
candidate appears to be the delegation defence,
combined with cliques. This combination may
in some ways reflect the reported ‘virtualisa-
tion’ strategies of some modern insurgent net-
works.
Above all, this work provides a systematic
way to evolve and test security concepts relat-
ing to the topology of networks. Clearly the
coevolution of attack and defense can be taken
much further. Further work includes testing:
1. networks that grow or shrink, maybe with
endogenous replenishment (current recruit-
ment a function of past operational success)
2. imperfectly informed attackers, such as po-
licemen who have access to the records of
some but not all phone companies or email
service providers, or who must use purely
local measures of centrality
3. perfectly informed defenders, who can co-
ordinate connectivity globally
4. budget tradeoffs – for example, a defender
might be able to hide specific edges but only
at some cost to his replenishment budget
5. heterogeneous networks, with
subpopulations having different robustness
preferences
6. dynamic strategies that detect opponents’
strategies and respond
7. different attacker goals. For example, some
say that the Iraqi rebel leader Al-Zarqawi
is not bin Laden’s subordinate but his com-
petitor. So an attack objective might be
not just partition, but to divide the opposi-
tion into groups of less than a certain size.
When attacking an ad-hoc sensor network,
the goal might be to reduce the effective
bandwidth, and there might be interaction
with routing algorithms.
Preliminary though it is, we suggest that
this work has broad potential applicability –
from making the Internet more resilient against
natural disasters and malicious attacks, to the
question of how best to disrupt (or design) sub-
versive networks.
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